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Person-specific Theory of Mind in Medial pFC
B. Locke Welborn and Matthew D. Lieberman
Abstract
■ Although research on theory of mind has strongly impli-
cated the dorsomedial pFC (incuding medial BA 8 and BA 9),
the unique contributions of medial pFC (MPFC; corresponding
to medial BA 10) to mentalizing remain uncertain. The extant
literature has considered the possibility that these regions
may be specialized for self-related cognition or for reasoning
about close others, but evidence for both accounts has been
inconclusive. We propose a novel theoretical framework: MPFC
selectively implements “person-specific theories of mind”
(ToMp) representing the unique, idiosyncratic traits or attri-
butes of well-known individuals. To test this hypothesis, we
used fMRI to assess MPFC responses in Democratic and Re-
publican participants as they evaluated more or less subjectively
well-known political figures. Consistent with the ToMp account,
MPFC showed greater activity to subjectively well-known tar-
gets, irrespective of participantsʼ reported feelings of closeness
or similarity. MPFC also demonstrated greater activity on trials
in which targets (whether politicians or oneself ) were judged
to be relatively idiosyncratic, making a generic theory of mind
inapplicable. These results suggest that MPFC may supplement
the generic theory of mind process, with which dorsomedial
pFC has been associated, by contributing mentalizing capac-
ities tuned to individuated representations of specific well-known
others. ■
INTRODUCTION
The capacity to make sense of the mental states and traits
of others is an extraordinary ability that allows us to plot a
course through the complexities of social life. Countless
studies have identified regions of the medial pFC (MPFC)
involved in thinking about the mental states of others
and of ourselves (Amodio & Frith, 2006). Within this
region, an asymmetry has been observed (Lieberman,
2010; Van Overwalle, 2009), such that dorsomedial pFC
(DMPFC; medial aspects of BA 8/BA 9) is more often found
in studies of mentalizing (i.e., thinking about the mental
states and traits of others), whereas a more ventral area
of MPFC (medial aspect of BA 10) is more often found in
studies of self-reflection (i.e., thinking about oneʼs own
states and traits; Denny, Kober, Wager, & Ochsner, 2012).
A number of recent investigations have attempted to
clarify the ways in which MPFC might also contribute to
mentalizing.
Early neuroimaging studies of trait self-knowledge, a
form of self-reflection, typically included famous targets
as controls (e.g., George Bush), and more often than
not, the comparison of self to famous targets yielded ac-
tivity in MPFC (Kelley et al., 2002). A few studies also
included a well-known close other as a control, and un-
like the famous targets, the close others often produced
MPFC activity similar to that of self-reference (Vanderwal,
Hunyadi, Grupe, Connors, & Schultz, 2008; Ochsner et al.,
2005; cf. Heatherton et al., 2006). Research from Mitchell,
Banaji, and Macrae (2005) provides a potential account of
these results in terms of the perceived similarity of close
oth rs. If close others are perceived to be similar to the
self, then reflecting on oneʼs own reactions to a query
and projecting this on to the other person would be an
efficient strategy for estimating the otherʼs reactions.
Consistent with this hypothesis, activity in MPFC during
mentalizing judgments of a social target has been shown
to vary parametrically with perceived similarity to the
self (Mitchell et al., 2005). Social targets with a political
orientation similar to the self (liberal/conservative) also
elicit greater MPFC response during judgments of pref-
erences than do politically dissimilar others (Mitchell,
Macrae, & Banaji, 2006). By this account, the essential func-
tion of MPFC is self-knowledge, but this self-knowledge
can be used strategically to make inferences about similar
others.
A second account suggests that the closeness of others to
oneself is the key factor driving MPFC activity. More spe-
cifically, Krienen, Tu, and Buckner (2010) have suggested
that MPFC is primarily sensitive to the social relevance to
or social distance from oneself, signaling friendship and
kinship affiliation rather than abstract similarity. In their
research, MPFC was consistently more responsive to real-
world friends than to unknown strangers, even when those
strangers were judged to be more similar to the self than
comparable friends. Thus, similarity and kinship accounts
of MPFC contributions to mentalizing have both garnered
a fair amount of empirical support.
In the current research, we propose a novel characteri-
zation of MPFCʼs contribution to mentalizing that wouldUniversity of California, Los Angeles
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simultaneously account for existing data on self-reflection,
similarity, and kinship. DMPFC has often been character-
ized as supporting our theory of mind (Wimmer & Perner,
1983), a generic model of how minds react to various
situations and experiences. This generic theory of mind
(ToMg) can be applied to anyone in a real or imagined
context—allowing us, for example, to confidently predict
how a typical male adult with a gun to his head would re-
spond to a request to express his undying love of Justin
Bieberʼs music (compared with when the gun is absent
from the same scene). Nearly all neuroimaging studies of
theory of mind have focused on strangers or imaginary
characters for which a ToMg is sensible to apply.
However, in our daily life, we interact with friends,
family, and coworkers repeatedly and often learn that
their distinctive personalities mean that our ToMg does
not always apply. Instead, we may generate a person-
specific theory of mind (ToMp) that is tailored to a partic-
ular individual. Whereas there is a considerable body of
evidence showing that DMPFC supports generic menta-
lizing (ToMg), we hypothesize that MPFC supports ToMp
and aimed to test this notion empirically. More specifi-
cally, we predicted that MPFC would be more active for
social targets about whom we have extensive knowledge,
particularly when this knowledge is both idiosyncratic to
that target and relevant to a judgment to be made.
The ToMp hypothesis can account for results associated
with the existing theoretical perspectives discussed above.
Close relationships with well-known others naturally fur-
nish us with a diverse array of interpersonal experiences,
from which we can generate a unique ToMp. In the case
of similar others, we may draw upon an especially rich
ToMp, that of the self. Thus, a ToMp account of MPFC func-
tion is congruent with the findings associated with the
similarity and closeness approaches. This approach also
suggests that representations of the self are not qualita-
tively distinct from other person-specific representations,
but rather are the most well-developed exemplars of the
kinds of social representations handled by MPFC more
broadly.
The ToMp hypothesis can also be distinguished from
these other approaches on empirical grounds. Only the
ToMp hypothesis predicts that MPFC will be recruited
when thinking about individuals about whom we have
a great deal of idiosyncratic knowledge but who are also
disliked and perceived as dissimilar from us. To test this
hypothesis, we asked individuals with a strong political
affiliation (Democrat/Republican) to make trait judgments
about four political figures, two in the participantʼs own
political party (Own Party) and two in the opposing party
(Opposition Party). We assumed that the political targets
in the participantʼs own party would be seen as both
more similar and closer to oneself than the political targets
in the opposing party. Critically, we also manipulated
the political targets used such that the amount of prior
knowledge about them varied (see Figure 1). Within each
political party, participants nominated one political figure
about whom they knew a considerable amount (high-
knowledge targets) and one political figure about whom
they knew relatively little (low-knowledge targets).
We hypothesized that regardless of political affiliation,
participants would generate greater MPFC activity to well-
known political targets, because of the recruitment of a
ToMp, than to the less well-known political targets, for
which only the ToMg would be available. We also hypoth-
esized that, for each trait judgment, the extent to which
the political target is judged to be distinctive from both
the self and the typical person reflects the likelihood
that a ToMp is being applied to a particular trait, because
neither projection from the self or a ToMg would be
Figure 1. Example targets
for a hypothetical Democratic
participant, reflecting an
experimental crossing of
the Knowledge and Party
Affiliation factors. Targets
were selected independently
for each participant, based
on self-reported knowledge
of Own Party and Opposition
Party political figures. See
Table 1 for descriptive data
related to each target.
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applicable. Thus, MPFC should be more active during
judgments of more idiosyncratic traits for a given tar-
get. Finally, we also hypothesized that MPFC during the
retrieval of self-knowledge reflects the use of one ToMp
among several, rather than a “self” mechanism, per se.
Consequently, we predicted that MPFC would be more
active during self-judgments on traits for which the self
is judged to be idiosyncratic (i.e., distinct from the typical
person).
METHODS
Participants
Sixteen participants (8 women) were recruited by a com-
bination of e-mail solicitations and in-person presentations
at undergraduate Democratic and Republican clubs at Uni-
versity of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). All participants
(a) indicated strong affiliation with either the Democratic
or Republican party by selecting either 0–2 or 8–10
respectively on an 11-point Likert scale anchored
on either end at either “Strongly Republican” and
“Strongly Democratic”;
(b) indicated that they considered themselves to be at least
moderately knowledgeable regarding current Ameri-
can politics (>5 on a 9-point Likert scale anchored at
1 = not at all knowledgeable, 5 =moderately knowl-
edgeable, and 9 = extremely knowledgeable); and
(c) met target selection criteria detailed below.
Participants were judged ineligible for participation if they
did not meet the above criteria. In addition, participants
were ineligible if they were left-handed, using psychoactive
medications or drugs, had been diagnosed with a neuro-
logical or psychiatric disorder, were pregnant, had a history
of claustrophobia, or presented any other condition that
would render participation in fMRI research hazardous.
Participants were all young adults between 18 and 29 years
(M = 22.1, SD = 3.2). All participants were compensated
$40 for their contribution to this research. Participants
provided written informed consent approved by the UCLA
Institutional Review Board. One participantʼs data are not
included in these analyses because of partial data acquisi-
tion failure.
Target Selection
Four political figures (one high-knowledge target and one
low-knowledge target from each party) were selected
ideographically for each participant based on a screening
questionnaire that queried participants about each of
50 contemporary politicians. All potential targets included
in the screening questionnaire were active political fig-
ures who presently or formerly (<5 years prior) served in
one more of the following offices: President of the United
States, Senator, Congressional Representative, or State
Governor. No targets were included that might be well
known for reasons unrelated to politics and governance
(e.g., Arnold Schwarzenegger, Jesse Ventura, or Al Franken)
or who had been associated with highly publicized scandals
or controversies (e.g., Bill Clinton or Larry Craig).
For each screening target, participants indicated their
degree of knowledge and liking on 9-point Likert scales
and reported the targetʼs party affiliation. Responses on
both scales were used to select four targets for the scan-
ning session (one high-knowledge target and one low-
knowledge target from each party) subject to the following
conditions:
(1) Each participantʼs high-knowledge targets were rated
between Very knowledgeable and Extremely knowl-
edgeable (knowledge scale values of 7–9).
(2) Each participantʼs low-knowledge targets were rated be-
tween Slightly knowledgeable and Moderately knowl-
edgeable (knowledge scale values of 2–5) and at least
4 points lower than both high-knowledge targets.
(3) Each participantʼs own party candidates were liked
(liking scale values of >5). Opposition party candi-
dates were disliked (liking scale values of <5).
(4) All targetsʼ party affiliations were correctly identified.
These criteria accomplished the following objectives:
(a) ensure appropriate like/dislike attitudes toward own
party and opposite party targets, (b) provide targets with
desired variation in knowledge for the political targets,
and (c) accommodate individual differences in the use
of screening scales (see Figure 1 for example targets for
a hypothetical Democratic participant). Participants were
excluded if appropriate targets could not be identified.
This individualized target selection procedure subjected
each participant to a 2 (target politician knowledge, High
vs. Low) × 2 (target politician party affiliation, Own Party
vs. Opposition Party) within-subject factorial design, yield-
ing four cells (see Figure 1). As detailed below, participants
judged the applicability of trait words to each political
figure while undergoing fMRI. Planned comparisons be-
tween hemodynamic activity associated with assessments
of target politicians in different experimental conditions
(e.g., High Knowledge > Low Knowledge, Own Party >
Opposition Party) allowed for a direct test of our primary
hypothesis regarding the function of MPFC.
Behavioral Measures
Given that self-reports of knowledge assessments may
be biased and/or self-serving, participants were asked
(after scanning) to write essays demonstrating their politi-
cal knowledge of each target. Ratings of these essays by
independent evaluators blind to experimental hypotheses
were used as an alternative (unbiased) measure of target
knowledge.
In their essays, participants were instructed to de-
scribe the targetʼs activities in politics and government,
stances on contemporary political issues, and important
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accomplishments. These essays were rated by trained
evaluators (research assistants) who were blind to the
participantʼs party affiliation and the experimental con-
dition of the target political figure. Evaluators were in-
structed to judge how knowledgeable the participant
was about the target in the domain of politics and govern-
ment, using a 7-point Likert scale anchored at not at all
knowledgeable and extremely knowledgeable. Essay-rated
knowledge scores reflecting ratersʼ independent judg-
ments of participantsʼ target-specific knowledge were thus
available for all four political figure targets. Evaluators did
not possess any special political expertise and were not
affiliated with either political party. Parametric modulation
of activity in MPFC by essay-rated target knowledge is em-
ployed as a complementary test of the ToMp hypothesis.
Lastly, participants completed self-report measures indi-
cating their degree of overall similarity, closeness, and con-
nectedness to each of the four political targets selected for
the scanner task (range 0–10, inclusive). Participants also
completed a measure of perceived personal overlap with
each of the political targets (range 1–7, inclusive).
fMRI Paradigms
While undergoing fMRI, participants completed a trait judg-
ment task (“Politician Judgment Task”) in which they rated
the applicability of 30 personality traits to each of the four
target political figures over three functional runs. In two
separate functional runs, participants rated the applicability
of these 30 traits to the self as well as to the ordinary Ameri-
can (“Self/Ordinary American Judgment Task”). A case
judgment control task (uppercase/lowercase) using the
same trait words and phrases was included in all runs as an
experimental control.
Trait words and phrases were selected for the above
tasks from a larger list on the basis of pilot testing within
the UCLA undergraduate population, ensuring that items
were comprehensible and meaningful to participants. All
trait items were relevant to the domain of politics and
governance (e.g., “patriotic,” “able to take command,”
“opportunistic”). A mixed block/event-related design was
employed to best explore hypotheses concerning both tar-
get level and trial level effects, with trial events grouped
into superordinate blocks based on target identity. During
each trait judgment trial, participants used an on-screen
9-point Likert-type scale to indicate the applicability of
the specified trait to the current target.
Trait judgments of political figures were spread over
three functional runs, with each run containing eight ex-
perimental blocks and two control blocks. Block order
within and between runs was randomized for each partici-
pant, with the following constraints: (1) the same target
was never selected for two consecutive blocks, (2) each
political figure appeared at least once in each run, (3) no
political figure appeared more than twice in any single run,
and (4) no more than two blocks featuring targets from
the same party were presented consecutively.
Trait judgments regarding the self and the ordinary
American were spread over two functional runs, with
each run containing six experimental blocks (3 Self and
3 Ordinary American) and two control blocks. Block order
for Self/Ordinary American judgments was similarly ran-
domized, with no two blocks of the same type occurring
consecutively. In total, participants completed six blocks
of trait judgment for each political figure, for the self
and for the ordinary American, and 10 control blocks.
Each block consisted of a 2-sec introduction specifying
the target, followed by five trait judgment trials, and con-
cluding with a 5-sec rest period between blocks. During
each trait judgment trial, participants used an on-screen
9-point Likert-type scale to indicate the applicability of
the specified trait to the current target. Trait words and
phrases appeared on-screen for 5 sec, during which par-
ticipants moved the scale to the appropriate response
value and confirmed their selection. Scale movement
and stimulus duration were determined on the basis of
pilot testing, such that participants could comfortably
make their judgments, move the on-screen scale, and
confirm their responses in the allotted time. Trait words
and phrases, as well as the scale selection indicator, were
removed from the screen following response selection.
Each trial was followed by a jittered ISI drawn from an
exponential random distribution with a mean of 2 sec.
Stimulus presentation was identical for Self/Ordinary
American runs, except that the targets of judgment dif-
fered. During the control task, the same 30 trait words
were presented in either all uppercase or all lowercase
letters, and participants were required to make a binary
case judgment. This task was designed to control for
basic perceptual and motor processing associated with
the use of the on-screen scale, as well as spontaneous
lexicosemantic processing unrelated to the trait judgments
themselves.
fMRI Data Acquisition
All imaging data were acquired using a 3.0-T Siemens Trio
scanner at the Ahmanson-Lovelace Brain Mapping Center
at UCLA. Across five functional runs, 761 T2*-weighted
echo-planar images were acquired during completion
of experimental tasks described above (slice thickness =
3 mm, gap = 1 mm, 36 slices, repetition time [TR] =
2000 msec, echo time [TE] = 25 msec, flip angle = 90°,
matrix = 64 × 64, field of view = 200 mm). An oblique
slice angle was used to minimize signal dropout in ventral
medial portions of the brain. In addition, a T2-weighted,
matched-bandwidth anatomical scan was acquired for
each participant (TR = 5000 msec, TE = 34 msec, flip
angle = 90°, matrix = 128 × 128; otherwise identical to
EPIs). Lastly, we acquired a T1-weighted magnetically pre-
pared rapid acquisition gradient-echo anatomical image
(slice thickness = 1 mm, 176 slices, TR = 2530 msec,
TE = 3.31 msec, flip angle = 7°, matrix = 256 × 256, field
of view = 256 mm).
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fMRI Data Preprocessing and Analysis
Preprocessing and ROI Definition
Functional data were analyzed using SPM8 (Wellcome
Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK). Within
each functional run, image volumes were corrected for
slice acquisition timing, realigned to correct for head
motion, segmented by tissue type, and normalized into
standard MNI stereotactic space (resampled at 3 ×
3 × 3 mm) using a diffeomorphic registration algorithm
(Ashburner, 2007). Finally, images were smoothed with
an 8-mm Gaussian kernel, FWHM. Given our specific
hypotheses regarding the role of MPFC in deploying
ToMp, all principal analyses were conducted on a pre-
defined MPFC ROI. This ROI was constructed using the
Automated Anatomical Labeling toolbox (Tzourio-Mazoyer
et al., 2002) of the Wakeforest University Pickatlas (Maldjian,
Laurienti, Burdette, & Kraft, 2003), encompassing BA 10.
This base region was dilated and constrained to the medial
aspect (−15 < x < 15). All ROI analyses reported below
interrogate only voxels within this region.
Two analytical strategies were employed to assess the
role of MPFC in ToMp. First, we used selective averaging
for hypothesis testing on the ROI considered as a whole
functional unit. Given the relatively large volume of the
MPFC, we also use an alternative exploratory approach,
searching within the same ROI for significant clusters and
correcting for multiple comparisons within that search
space. Monte Carlo simulations implemented in 3dClust-
Sim (from AFNI; Cox, 1996) were used to determine ap-
propriate cluster size thresholds given the smoothness of
the images (16 contiguous voxels) to ensure overall false
discovery rate (FDR) of less than 0.05, when combined
with a voxel-wise significance threshold of p < .005. All
results reported exceed these joint voxel-wise and cluster-
extent thresholds.
Target Level Analyses
For both the Politician Judgment Task and the Self/Ordinary
American Judgment Task, we defined a general linear
model (GLM) for each participant. Blocks were modeled
as variable epochs spanning the duration between the
onset of the first trial and the offset of the final trial, con-
volved with the canonical (double-gamma) HR. For the
Politician Judgment Task, five regressors of interest were
modeled (High Knowledge, Own Party; High Knowledge,
Opposition Party; Low Knowledge, Own Party; Low Knowl-
edge, Opposition Party; Case Judgment Control). For the
Self/Ordinary American Judgment Task, three regressors
of interest were modeled (Self; Ordinary American; Case
Judgment Control). All analyses controlled for 18 motion
parameters (3 translations and rotations, as well as their
squares and first-order derivatives). The time series was
high-pass filtered using a cutoff period of 128 sec, and
serial autocorrelations were modeled as an AR(1) pro-
cess. Contrast images were averaged across runs for each
participant and entered into a mixed effects analysis at
the group level. Parameter estimates were extracted from
the MPFC ROI using MarsBaR (Brett, Anton, Valabregue,
& Poline, 2002) and subjected to a repeated-measures
ANOVA. In the results presented below and the accom-
panying figures, parameter estimates reflect contrasts
between the appropriate experimental condition and the
case judgment control task, unless otherwise noted.
Target level factors (overall similarity, closeness, con-
nectedness, personal overlap, scored knowledge, mean
similarity, mean idiosyncrasy, and mean positivity) not
subject to experimental manipulation were analyzed as
parametric modulators of activity in the MPFC ROI. The
effects of each factor (when appropriate, controlling for
other factors, see below) were assessed based on the
appropriate parameter estimates from a GLM, identical to
the above except for the different regressors of interest
(that is, regressors reflected continuous scores on target
level variables, rather than target identity).
Trial-by-trial Trait Level Analyses
The effects of trial-to-trial trait level perceived similarity,
idiosyncrasy, and positivity were assessed using analyses of
parametric modulation of the hemodynamic response to
each of three trial level predictors (similarity, idiosyncrasy,
and positivity) implemented using an event-related GLM.
Similarity was operationalized as the absolute value of the
difference between self-judgments and political target
judgments on a given trait, with small values indicating high
similarity. Idiosyncrasy was computed as the absolute value
of the difference between judgments of the political target
and judgments of the ordinary American, with large values
indicating high idiosyncrasy. Judgment positivity simply
reflected the participantʼs rating of a given political target
on a specific trait (reverse-coded for trait words or phrases
judged by a pilot sample to be negative). For self-judgments,
we also computed an index analogous to target idiosyn-
crasy, reflecting the distinctiveness of the self on a given
trait, relative to the ordinary American. This self-idiosyncrasy
was operationalized as the absolute value of the difference
between judgments of the self and judgments of the ordi-
nary American on a particular trait, with large values indi-
cating high self-idiosyncrasy. The GLMs used to assess the
effects of trait level factors differed from those used to assess
target level factors in that specific trials (rather than the
superordinate block) were modeled as discrete events,
using a variable epoch spanning the duration from trial
onset to response.
RESULTS
Behavioral Results
Eight participants identified as strong members of the
Democratic Party, whereas seven identified as strong
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members of the Republican Party. See Table 1 for a
summary of descriptive data discussed below.
Target Differences in Self-reported Knowledge,
Closeness, Connectedness, Personal Overlap,
and Overall Similarity
Participants indicated that they possessed greater knowl-
edge of High-knowledge targets than Low-knowledge
targets (Mhigh = 7.90, Mlow = 3.43, t = 19.31, p <
.001). This result is direct consequence of the target
selection procedures employed (see Methods above for
details). Self-reported knowledge did not differ signifi-
cantly between Own Party and Opposition Party targets
(MOwn = 5.77, MOpp = 5.57, t = 1.71, ns).
Participants judged themselves to be more similar
(MOwn = 5.44, MOpp = .66, t = 16.51, p < .001), closer
(MOwn = 4.61, MOpp = .14, t = 10.67, p < .001), and
more connected (MOwn = 5.28, MOpp = .25, t = 17.09,
p < .001) to Own Party than to Opposition Party tar-
gets. In addition, participants perceived greater personal
overlap with Own Party relative to Opposition Party tar-
gets (MOwn = 5.00, MOpp = 1.50, t = 14.34, p < .001).
Participants did not see themselves as more similar to
High-knowledge targets than to Low-knowledge targets
and did not perceive greater overlap (all ps ns). How-
ever, participants did feel closer (Mhigh = 3.00, Mlow =
1.75, t = 5.49, p < .001) and more connected (Mhigh =
3.32, Mlow = 2.21, t = 3.60, p = .003) to high-knowledge
targets than to low-knowledge targets. For this reason,
relevant target level analyses reported below control for
closeness and connectedness to target.
Target Differences in Knowledge, Assessed by
Individual Essays
Participantsʼ essays regarding each political figure were
coded by three research assistants who were blind to the
targetʼs experimental condition. The Spearman–Brown re-
liability of these ratings across raters is 0.75, suggesting
that they represent a reasonably reliable measure of target
knowledge. Consistent with self-reports, participants
demonstrated greater essay-rated knowledge of High-
knowledge relative to Low-knowledge targets (Mhigh =
4.08, Mlow = 3.31, t = 6.55, p < .001). In contrast, Own
Party and Opposition Party targets did not differ in essay-
rated knowledge (MOwn = 4.13,MOpp = 3.92, t= 1.00, ns).
Target Differences in Trait Level Idiosyncrasy,
Similarity, and Positivity
On the basis of participantsʼ trait ratings of political figure
targets during the scanner session, aggregate indices of
target idiosyncrasy, positivity, and similarity were com-
puted (see Methods). On average, participants judged
High-knowledge targets to be more idiosyncratic than
Low-knowledge targets (Mhigh = 2.33, Mlow = 1.77,
t = 5.15, p < .001), but not more positive (Mhigh = 0.69,
Table 1. Descriptive Behavioral Data Summarized for Each of Four Political Figure Targets
High Knowledge Low Knowledge
Own Party Opposition Party Own Party Opposition Party
Self-Report
Knowledge (0–10) 8.00 7.80 3.53 3.33
Closeness (0–10) 5.93 0.07 3.29 0.21
Connectedness (0–10) 6.50 0.14 4.07 0.36
Overall similarity (0–10) 5.86 0.39 5.02 0.93
Personal overlap (1–7) 5.29 1.43 4.71 1.57
Rated
Knowledge (1–7) 4.86 4.62 3.40 3.21
Trial-based
Idiosyncrasy (0–8) 2.41 2.26 1.83 1.71
Similarity (0–8) 6.57 4.95 6.77 5.44
Positivity (−4 to 4) 2.17 −0.79 1.48 −0.31
Self-report items reflect participant responses to questionnaire items. Scored knowledge data are derived from coder ratings of individual essays on
the accomplishments, positions, values, and career of each political figure target. Trial-based items represent aggregate means of idiosyncrasy,
similarity, and positivity across trait judgments completed during the scanning session (see Methods for details regarding these indices).
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Mlow = 0.59, t = 0.64, ns). Low-knowledge targets were
judged to be more similar to the Self than High-knowledge
targets (Mhigh = 5.76, Mlow = 6.11, t= 2.61, p= .02). Own
Party targets were not judged to bemore idiosyncratic than
Opposition Party targets (MOwn = 2.12, MOpp = 1.98,
t = 0.62, ns). However, as expected, on a trial-by-trial
basis, participants judged Own Party targets to be more
similar to the Self than Opposition Party targets (MOwn =
6.67, MOpp = 5.20, t = 5.97, p < .001) and more positive
overall (MOwn = 1.83, MOpp = −0.55, t = 8.58, p < .001).
fMRI Results
Target Level Experimental Factors: Knowledge and
Party Affiliation
Our primary hypothesis was that MPFC activity would be
greater for High-knowledge targets than Low-knowledge
targets, as the former would rely on ToMp more than
the latter. Additionally, we hypothesized that this effect
would not be moderated by Own/Other Party status of
the targets. Repeated-measures ANOVA indicated that
MPFC was more responsive to High-knowledge than to
Low-knowledge targets (F(1, 13) = 16.799, p = .001),
but not more responsive to Own Party than to Opposition
Party targets (F(1, 13) = 0.025, ns), as shown in Figure 2.
(One participant was dropped from target level analyses.
One ordered pair [essay-rated target knowledge, MPFC
ROI parameter estimate] from this participant was iden-
tified as an extreme multivariate outlier. Cookʼs D for this
case was 1.00, exceeding our threshold of 0.07.)
No interaction between target Knowledge and Party
Affiliation was observed (F(1, 13) = 0.130, ns). Follow-up
comparisons between specific cells showed greater ac-
tivity to High-knowledge Own Party targets than to Low-
knowledge Own Party targets (t(13) = 2.705, p = .018)
and to High-knowledge Opposition Party targets than to
Low-knowledge Opposition Party targets (t(13) = 3.004,
p = .010). Each of these effects was also identified when
we searched within the MPFC mask for significant clus-
ters (see Table 2). In a whole-brain conjunction analysis
(of High Knowledge Own Party > Low Knowledge Own
Party ∩ High Knowledge Opposition Party > Low Knowl-
edge Opposition party), only the MPFC demonstrated
activity sensitive to target knowledge across both parties
(peak MNI: −6, 53, 13; t = 6.77, k = 76).
Participants also showed greater activity in the MPFC to
Self trials than to Ordinary American trials (t(13) = 4.06,
p = .001), replicating self-reference effects observed in
previous research (Denny et al., 2012; Heatherton et al.,
Figure 2. MPFC demonstrated
greater activity to High-
knowledge than to Low-
knowledge targets. There was
no significant effect of Party
Affiliation on activity in the
MPFC and no interaction
between Party Affiliation and
target Knowledge. MPFC also
demonstrated greater activity
to Self trials than to Ordinary
American trials. Parameter
estimates (relative to control)
are plotted separately for
each target. Error bars reflect
the SEM. See also Table 2
for associated search-within
analysis.
Table 2. Summary of Search-within Analyses for the MPFC ROI
Test Effect x y z t k
Target Level Analyses
High > low knowledge
(both parties)
−9 56 19 6.01 320
−12 50 −11 5.08
−3 53 −2 4.73
High > low knowledge
(Own party)
6 59 13 4.17 59
−6 53 −5 3.98 28
High > low knowledge
(Opp party)
−3 56 13 6.7 165
Essay-rated target knowledge −6 50 13 7.27 173
Trial-by-trial Trait Level Analyses
Trait level political figure
idiosyncrasy
−6 42 3 5.29 73
Trait level self-idiosyncrasy −15 48 −12 4.45 16
All results are FDR-corrected p < .05 with combined voxel-wise p and
cluster size thresholds (see Methods). Coordinates reported are from
local maxima separated by at least 20 mm. x, y, and z = MNI coordinates
in left–right, anterior–posterior, and inferior–superior dimensions; peak
t = t statistic value at the each local maxima; k = cluster voxel extent;
cluster p(FWE) = cluster level FWE probability.
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2006; Kelley et al., 2002). The MPFC did not differentiate
between the Self and High-knowledge Own Party targets
(t(13) = 0.718, ns) or High-knowledge Opposition Party
targets (t(13) = 0.434, ns). However, this region was sig-
nificantly more active to Self trials than to Low-knowledge
Own Party targets (t(13) = 2.22, p = .0451) and Low-
knowledge Opposition Party targets (t(13) = 2.490, p =
.027). This pattern of results is sensible if MPFC is respond-
ing to available knowledge concerning the target (including
the Self ) but is more difficult to explain if MPFC is encod-
ing information concerning similarity or party affiliation.
Target Level Nonexperimental Factors
Consistent with our primary hypothesis, essay-rated target
knowledge (i.e., participant knowledge of each target, de-
fined by ratings of the essays the participant wrote about
each target) demonstrated a significant linear relationship
with activity within the MPFC ROI when controlling for
closeness to the target (t(13) = 3.339, p= .005), but close-
ness did not significantly predict activity in this region
(t(13) = 1.584, ns). Separate analyses show a consistent
positive relationship between essay-rated target knowl-
edge and activity in the MPFC ROI, controlling separately
for connectedness to target (t(13) = 3.157, p = .008), per-
ceived personal overlap (t(13) = 4.244, p < .001), and
overall similarity (t(13) = 3.472, p = .004). In contrast,
there was no relationship between MPFC activity and
target level closeness (t(13) = 1.584, ns), connectedness
(t(13) = 1.192, ns), overlap (t(13) = 0.238, ns), or overall
similarity (t(13) = 0.721, ns). As can be seen in the plots of
essay-rated target knowledge against parameter estimates
from the MPFC ROI (target > control; Figure 3), MPFC ac-
tivity is positively associated with essay-rated target knowl-
edge for political figures from Own and Opposition Parties.
Each of these effects was also identified when we searched
within the MPFC ROI for significant clusters (see Table 2).
These results are not easily explained by similarity and
closeness accounts of MPFC function. The MPFC showed
sensitivity to within-subject variation in target knowledge
(both as assessed using experimental contrasts and using
independent, essay-rated target knowledge) that was not
attenuated by controlling for self-reported closeness, con-
nectedness, personal overlap, or overall similarity. In con-
trast, none of the other target level factors significantly
predicted activity in this region.
Trial-by-trial Trait Level Analyses of Idiosyncrasy
Trial-by-trial analyses allow characterization of MPFC re-
sponse to factors such as idiosyncrasy and similarity that
vary from trait to trait both within and across targets (i.e.,
a participant may view the same candidate as idiosyncratic
on some traits but not others). High idiosyncrasy trait judg-
ments cannot depend on the deployment of ToMg, as the
target is perceived to differ from the ordinary American
on the trait in question and therefore ought instead to de-
pend on a ToMp. To rule out other explanations of hemo-
dynamic response associated with our trial-by-trial index
of target idiosyncrasy, analyses reported below employ
statistical controls for perceived similarity to self and RT.
These analyses were run across all trials, ignoring the iden-
tity of the target and target level factors (e.g., closeness,
party affiliation). The MPFC ROI demonstrated a significant
linear relationship with trait level idiosyncrasy (t(14) =
2.257, p = .040), controlling for trait similarity, positivity,
and RT, such that greater activity was observed for trials
on which targets were judged to be more idiosyncratic.
Similarity and positivity were each marginally significant
as unique predictors of MPFC activity (t(14) = 1.919, p =
.076 and t(14) = 1.798, p = .094, respectively), but were
not significant controlling for idiosyncrasy.
Conjunction Analysis: Target Level Essay-rated
Knowledge and Trait Level Idiosyncrasy
To examine the relationship between essay-rated target
knowledge and trait level idiosyncrasy, we performed a
conjunction analysis using the minimum statistic (Nichols,
Brett, Andersson, Wager, & Poline, 2005) from these analy-
Figure 3. Activity within the
MPFC ROI demonstrated a
significant linear relationship
with essay-rated target
knowledge for both Own Party
(A) and Opposition Party (B)
political figures. To present
this relationship graphically, we
plot MPFC parameter estimates
(p.e.) from the block target >
control comparison against
essay-rated target knowledge.
“X” marks represent self-
reported High-knowledge
targets; “O” marks represent
self-reported Low-knowledge
targets. See also Table 2 for
associated search-within analysis.
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ses (described above), constrained to the MPFC ROI. A
significant cluster was detected within this region (peak
MNI: −6, 47, 7; t = 4.53, k = 41; see Figure 4), suggesting
that MPFC supports both person-specific mentalizing
(ToMp) as well as judgments of particularly idiosyncratic
traits, regardless of overall target knowledge.
Self-idiosyncrasy
The ToMp hypothesis of MPFC suggests that this region is
not functionally devoted to self-processes per se. Rather,
according to the hypothesis, the representation of oneself
is typically the most idiosyncratic person representation
one has, and thus, accessing self-knowledge recruits this
region quite reliably. If this is the case, MPFC should be
more active during self-judgments to the extent that a per-
son views himself idiosyncratically on a particular trait.
Contrary to expectations, a parametric modulation of
self-judgments by trait level self-idiosyncrasy (controlling
for RT) failed to produce a significant response in MPFC
ROI as a whole (t = 1.397, ns). However, when we
searched within the ROI, we did observe a cluster whose
activity was significantly associated with self-idiosyncrasy
(MNI: −15, 48, −12; t = 4.45, k = 16; see Figure 5).
DISCUSSION
A variety of hypotheses have been advanced to explain
the unique contribution of MPFC processes to human
mentalizing (Lieberman, 2012). Although each of the ap-
proaches adopted thus far are plausible, the results of
the present research argue in favor of the ToMp account
of MPFC. This account is consistent with a wide range of
prior results and integrates them under a more coherent
umbrella account of MPFCʼs social cognitive functions. Cru-
cially, the MPFC was more responsive to High-knowledge
than to Low-knowledge targets, regardless of whether
the target was seen as similar or close to oneself (i.e., in
oneʼs own political party or the opposing party). In more
fine-grained analysis, MPFC was more active when judging
a target on a particular trait to the extent that the target
was seen as idiosyncratic on that dimension, differing from
both the typical person and the participant making the
judgment. Finally, MPFC was also more active when judging
the self on a particular trait to the extent that the self was
seen as more idiosyncratic on that trait, consistent with the
view that MPFC is not a self-knowledge region per se. The
self, on this view, is merely the paradigmatic instance of
an intimately well-known social target, and self-relevant cog-
nition is therefore extremely likely to be associated with
MPFC response.
Prior similarity findings are therefore consistent with
the ToMp account of MPFC. Personal similarity may lead
the social thinker to project her own attributes and pref-
erences on to others and engage in mental simulation
where appropriate when gauging similar othersʼ mental
states (Mitchell et al., 2005, 2006). According to the ToMp
account, this social reasoning strategy relies on the most
person-specific representation one has: the self. However,
it is just one of many person-specific mental models
represented by MPFC, and in other cases, we may recruit
this region when relying on another other non-self ToMp.
Unlike the similarity account, the ToMp account also pre-
dicts that MPFC can be involved in projecting from indi-
viduals other than the self. If a new target is deemed
similar to a friend or family member for whom we have
ToMp (“you remind me of my mother”), then MPFC
should be recruited as that ToMp is projected on to the
novel target.
Prior closeness findings (Krienen et al., 2010) are also
consistent with the ToMp account of MPFC, insofar as we
typically represent the minds of close others with detailed,
idiosyncratic models. However, only the ToMp account can
explain why MPFC is more active when thinking about
targets who are well known but neither similar nor close
to oneself, such as a well-known politician in an opposing
political party. In addition, of the three accounts, only
the ToMp account also predicts that thinking about more
idiosyncratic aspects of the self would differentially recruit
MPFC.
Figure 4. Essay-rated target knowledge and trait level idiosyncrasy
demonstrate overlapping neural correlates. Results of a conjunction
analysis constrained to the MPFC are displayed, showing activity
associated with essay-rated target knowledge (green), trait-by-trait
idiosyncrasy (red), and their conjunction (yellow). The conjunction
cluster consisted of 41 voxels, with peak at MNI −6, 47, 7. See also
Table 2 and Figure 5.
Figure 5. Trial-by-trial self-idiosyncrasy (difference from ordinary
American) predicted activity in the VMPFC ROI (while controlling
for judgment positivity) when assessing the applicability of trait
words to the self. Peak MNI: −15, 48, −12, FDR-corrected p < .05.
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Prior research has suggested that information about
specific dispositional traits, which may serve as a scaffold
for ToMp, is encoded in the MPFC in the form of a trait
code (Ma, Vandekerckhove, Van Overwalle, Seurinck, &
Fias, 2011; Ma, Baetens, Vandekerckhove, Kestemont,
et al., 2013; Ma, Baetens, Vandekerckhove, Van der
Cruyssen, & Van Overwalle, 2013). Rather than simply
encoding the valence of a given judgment, this research
implies that traits are represented in a discrete fashion
within MPFC. The availability of trait-specific information
is a necessary precursor for the formation of a ToMp, which
in addition requires the association of specific traits with
specific targets. This study suggests that MPFC does in fact
pair trait information with specific targets to produce con-
sistent representations of the minds of specific individuals.
Evidence concerning the existence of a trait code in the
MPFC enhances the plausibility of the ToMp account.
Against the interpretation of our present results as evi-
dence for person-specific mentalizing processes in MPFC,
one might argue that this region is simply responding to
the greater affective salience or importance of the High-
knowledge targets relative to the Low-knowledge targets.
However, we do not believe that this account is consistent
with the most recent work on the neural representation
of subjective value. Bartra, McGuire, and Kable (2013) have
recently considered these issues in a quantitative meta-
analysis and find that DMPFC and anterior insula do tend
to respond in a U-shaped fashion to subjective value,
whether positive or negative. In contrast, the MPFC seems
to respond preferentially to positive stimuli, rather than to
general arousal or saliency. In light of this work, selective
MPFC activity to High-knowledge targets (even when dis-
liked) is unlikely to reflect processing of their affective
salience.
ToMp and Group Size
The ToMp model of MPFC function is also consistent with
findings inspired by Dunbarʼs (1998) social brain hypothe-
sis, which links brain size across primate species with
group size. Although the group effects are often conceptu-
ally linked to the mentalizing network, including DMPFC,
most of the group size findings observed in human and
primate neuroimaging instead implicate MPFC. For exam-
ple, a number of recent studies show a linear relationship
between MPFC volume and social network size (Powell,
Lewis, Roberts, Garcia-Finana, & Dunbar, 2012; Lewis,
Rezaie, Brown, Roberts, & Dunbar, 2011; Powell, Lewis,
Dunbar, Garcia-Finana, & Roberts, 2010). Such results im-
ply that MPFC may be essential for encoding information
about multiple individuals in complex social arrangements.
Successfully navigating a relatively large social network
may depend on the ability to deploy a diverse repertoire
of ToMp, which may be facilitated by greater MPFC volume.
Most strikingly, Sallet et al. (2011) recently observed in-
creased gray matter in MPFC when macaques were moved
from smaller to larger living groups. If successful group
living depended solely on generic forms of social cognition,
it would scale easily to any group size because the same
generic knowledge applies to all individuals. Instead, suc-
cessful group living is partially about keeping track of
idiosyncratic social information about each relevant indi-
vidual and the distinctive relationships between individuals
in the group. Thus, the canonical mentalizing system may
support a basic capacity for group living, whereas MPFC
may drive the size of the manageable group. Groups with
complex social dynamics are characteristic of the human
species, and indeed BA 10 within MPFC is one of the only
frontal regions known to be disproportionately larger
in humans than other primates (Semendeferi, Armstrong,
Schleicher, Ziles, & Van Hoessen, 2001).
Why a Second System?
Evolutionary pressures may have expanded the volume of
MPFC in primates and humans, supplying them with more
robust social cognitive resources for living in increasingly
complex groups. However, such considerations do not ex-
plain why person-specific and generic forms of mentalizing
ought to be functionally and structurally differentiated in
distinct subregions of the MPFC to begin with. Insight into
this issue may be gained by consideration of analogous
distinctions in the cognitive neuroscience of declarative
memory.
The memory literature has long distinguished the roles
of neocortical versus hippocampal systems in the for-
mation, consolidation, and retrieval of memories over time
(Squire, Stark, & Clark, 2004; Alvarez & Squire, 1994).
Long-term, relatively permanent representations of a
semantic nature are thought to depend primarily on the
neocortex and to change only slowly over time. In contrast,
the hippocampus serves a crucial but time-limited func-
tion in declarative memory, conjoining the distributed
neocortical representations that together constitute the
memory as a whole (Squire, 1992).
Whereas the existence of multiple memory systems
and their interaction during learning has thus been well
characterized, the cognitive utility of encoding memory
in distinct, overlapping forms has not always been evident.
Using computational models, McClelland, McNaughton,
and OʼReilly (1995) presented an intriguing account of
the complementary contributions of hippocampal and
neocortical memory to the formation of categorical knowl-
edge. They found that the attempt to encode information
about the category membership of novel exemplars in a
single, unitary connectionist system produced “catastrophic
interference.” In brief, if modeled knowledge structures
were too malleable, they were ineffective at forming long-
term categorical representations and integrating informa-
tion from different observations over time. Instead, they
were disproportionately biased by the unique features of
each newly presented exemplar. In contrast, more rigid
knowledge structures were unable to evolve and incorpo-
rate novel information, because inflexible representations
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were insufficiently sensitive to new or atypical instances
(e.g., learning that a penguin is a bird, despite phenotypic
dissimilarity). McClelland et al. theorized that the hippo-
campal formation provides an intermediary system, capable
of storing new information in a form that does not inter-
fere destructively with established knowledge. Over time,
the aggregation of relevant information then shapes endur-
ing category representations in the more slowly adapting
neocortex.
We propose that a mechanism of this type might help
to explain the utility of different systems for generic and
person-specific mentalizing processes. The social thinker
cannot help but take for granted her extensive and sophis-
ticated understanding of how the minds of others form
beliefs, experience emotions, and make decisions. This
wealth of information constitutes our generic theory of
the human mind and, as such, must be applicable to a
diversity of situations. Precisely because its content has to
apply broadly to countless situations, its representational
features ought to be more fixed. By abstracting from the
idiosyncrasies of any particular individual or experience,
our ToMg retains an essential generalizability that facilitates
the understanding of novel mentalizing episodes. ToMg
ought therefore to develop slowly and change only when
many experiences considerably reshape our fundamental
assumptions and expectations regarding human thought,
feeling, and action. Consistent with this notion, prior re-
search has suggested DMPFC in abstract mentalizing con-
texts in which the application of a ToMg is appropriate
(Baetens, Ma, Steen, & Van Overwalle, 2013; Spunt, Satpute,
& Lieberman, 2011; Spunt, Falk, & Lieberman, 2010).
In contrast, a ToMp would allow for the efficient and
rapid encoding of unique, idiosyncratic information re-
garding particular, important individuals. Whether con-
cerning friends or enemies, similar or dissimilar others,
the use of ToMp may allow more precise inferences con-
cerning their mental states and more accurate predictions
of their future behavior. Separate systems for person-
specific and generic mentalizing would allow us to take
advantage of idiosyncratic knowledge in thinking about
those we know well, without resulting in destructive inter-
ference with our more general theory of mind.
Conclusions
The results reported above substantiate a novel account
of MPFC function, according to which this region imple-
ments ToMp and enables nuanced, adaptive responding
to the idiosyncratic characteristics of particular, well-known
individuals. ToMp can account for the empirical findings
associated with other approaches to mentalizing (e.g.,
similarity, closeness) but also provides new insights and
testable predictions that go beyond these perspectives.
Future research might elucidate the circumstances under
which ToMp and ToMg are deployed and better character-
ize the psychological and neural correlates of the forma-
tion of person-specific theories. In addition, further work
may help to uncover the relationship between ToMp and
other sources of mental state inference.
Reprint requests should be sent to Matthew D. Lieberman, De-
partment of Psychology, 4611 Franz Hall, University of Cali-
fornia, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1563, or via e-mail:
lieber@ucla.edu.
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